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Respect for Persons and the Authority of Morality
Matt Zwolinski
University of San Diego

1. Introduction
Libertarians are known for the intellectual challenges they pose to
the authority of the state. They have contested both its specific authority to
carry out certain tasks such as antitrust regulation and wealth redistribution, as
well its more general authority to claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of
1
force over a geographical area. For all this, libertarians are to be much
praised. Even when their positive arguments for a minimal state (or no state
at all) have not been completely persuasive, those arguments have
nevertheless helped to foster a much needed skepticism in the authority and
competence of the state, and to build up our confidence in the responsibility
and creativity of free individuals and the spontaneous orders they create.
What motivates libertarian skepticism about state authority, one
presumes, is the state’s inherently coercive nature. The commands of a state
are backed by force. And where there is force, there is always the danger that
force will be wrongfully applied. Governments can forcibly prevent
individuals from engaging in behavior in which they have a moral right to
engage (e.g., drug prohibition laws, anti-sodomy laws), it can force them to
engage in behaviors in which they have a moral right not to engage (e.g.,
mandatory helmet laws, military conscription), and it can use its coercive
power to wrongfully deprive individuals of their property and lives (e.g.,
eminent domain, the war in Iraq).
If, however, it is the coercive power of the state that troubles
libertarians, then it seems as though we ought to be equally skeptical about the
authority of any system purporting to govern the behavior of individuals by
1

The classic example among academic philosophers of a libertarian who opposes the
former sorts of authority, but not the latter, is Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and
Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). A more recent example of a libertarian who
opposes both sorts of state claim to authority is Randy Barnett, The Structure of
Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). For a discussion of the variety of
positions libertarians have advocated regarding state authority, and the different moral
foundations they have appealed to in making their arguments, see Matt Zwolinksi,
“Beyond Nozick: Libertarianism Without Self-Ownership” (unpublished).
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coercive means. And this category includes not just states, but morality,
especially that part of morality concerned with rights and correlative
obligations. A moral theory which recognizes rights as moral claims which
can be enforced by physical violence is a system for legitimizing and
controlling the use of violence just as much as any state is. And just as
individuals can, and should, question the authority of a state, so too they can
and should question the authority of moral systems. Furthermore, just as a
state might serve the interests of some individuals who live under it without
serving the interests of all, so too might a moral system serve the interests of
some individuals without serving all. In such cases, the question of whether a
moral system is legitimate for those individuals whose interests it fails to
serve is one which cannot simply be ignored. Why should the proletarian
accept the moral claim that he has no right to the bread I hold in abundance,
and that I am justified in using violence upon him if he tries to take it? The
system of property rights by which I justify my claim to bread might be
necessary to promote the general welfare, or to allow in general the pursuit of
personal projects, or to promote individual responsibility, but is that enough to
justify the moral system which licenses my use of violence against the
proletarian? Is it enough to justify it to the proletarian?
If these questions about the authority of morality sound strange, I
suspect it is because they are rarely addressed by libertarians, or by moral
philosophers in general, at least in these terms. One of the most outstanding
and admirable features of Jan Narveson’s work is his recognition of the
importance of these questions, and of the inadequacy of the standard
2
answers. That an action “violates natural rights,” or “fails to maximize
utility,” does not settle—or even address—the question of morality’s
authority. Perhaps those of us who are already committed to utility
maximization or respect for natural rights will be content with such answers.
But they do nothing for the person who does not already regard morality—or
these particular interpretations of morality—as authoritative for himself.
What is needed in order to establish morality’s authority for such persons is to
show how morality gives them reasons to act in certain ways–ways which
might be contrary to their desires and interests.

2

See, e.g., Jan Narveson, The Libertarian Idea (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
Press, 1988), p. 8, where Narveson stresses the importance of justifying political
authority to each person by reference to her own good, as she sees it. See also Jan
Narveson, Respecting Persons in Theory and Practice (New York: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2002), p. 69, on the difference between what reasons we might have for
wanting A to behave in some way, and the reasons A has for so behaving. And finally,
see Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, pp. 151-52, for a discussion of classical
utilitarianism’s failure to provide agents with a reason to abide by its dictates.
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The remainder of this essay will seek to explore the question of
morality’s authority, and to critically examine Narveson’s answer to that
question. I hope to shed light on the question by looking at the way in which
Narveson’s normative ethical theory—his theory about what kinds of
obligations or rights we have—is connected to and shaped by his metaethical
theory—his theory about the kind of phenomenon that morality is,
metaphysically, and the way in which it relates to human desires and interests.
Specifically, I am going to look at the relationship between the kind of reasongiving force Narveson takes morality to have, and the normative content of
the morality he takes to be reason-giving. I will argue that while Narveson is
more aware of the problem of morality’s authority than most, and takes pains
to address it through his contractarianism, his response is nevertheless not
entirely successful. In short, I think his attempt to claim that the reasongiving force of morality depends upon its ability to serve the interests of the
moral agent cannot be combined with a belief in the sort of universal and
near-absolute rights that most libertarians claim to believe in. One thing or
the other has to give—either morality’s reason-giving force is not as
dependent on its ability to serve our interests as Narveson (and many of us)
would like to think, or morality is more relativistic than Narveson (and many
of us) would like to think.
I will begin my paper by summarizing what I take to be some of the
most important elements of Narveson’s theory of morality. I will then argue
that this theory makes certain metaethical presuppositions, and will say what I
think those are. Finally, I will argue that these assumptions, taken together
and combined with certain reasonable assumptions about human nature, are
not mutually consistent. My concluding section will say where I think this
leaves us.
2. Narveson’s Theory of Morality
Let me begin by describing what morality is like, on Narveson’s
account. My summary in this section will be selective, focusing on only those
elements of the theory that are relevant for the metaethical position I wish to
unearth.
a. Reasons
First, morality according to Narveson is normative. It tells us what
we ought to do. Now, this in itself isn’t all that interesting. There are lots of
systems out there that tell us what to do. Etiquette, to borrow Philippa Foot’s
3
example, or Nazism for that matter, give us rules that are supposed to guide
our behavior too. What makes morality special, on Narveson’s view, is that
3

Philippa Foot, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” Philosophical
Review 81 (1972), p. 8.
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morality’s rules give us reasons to act. Indeed, morality gives us reasons
necessarily. We can shrug off the demands of etiquette (and certainly
Nazism) secure in the knowledge that our status as rational agents is not the
least bit threatened by our doing so. After all, just because these systems say
we ought to do something doesn’t mean we really have a reason to do so. But
morality is different. Once we conclude that some behavior is required by
morality, we have already concluded that it is something we have reason to
do, in the same way that once we have concluded that something is a
bachelor, we have already concluded that it is male. Reason-givingness, if
4
you’ll pardon the horrendous phrase, is part of our concept of morality.
b. Generality
The second point to note about Narveson’s account of morality has to
do with the nature of the reason-giving norms given to us by morality. It is
that these norms are general, in the sense of applying “to everyone in the
5
society, and not to select individuals.” Thus, if morality contains a rule
prohibiting the killing of innocents, this norm forbids everyone, not just a
certain sub-set of society, from killing innocents. Of course, to say that
morality is general is not to say that it takes no account of the particular
details of the circumstances. Morality might prohibit the killing of innocents
in most circumstances, but allow it when it is necessary to save the lives of a
greater number of innocents, for example. But if this is the case it is not a
counterexample to the generality thesis. Rather, it is simply a reminder that
the real moral rule is more complicated than simply “do not kill innocents.”
And this real moral rule, whatever it is, will meet the condition of generality,
for whatever exceptions it carves out from the general prohibition will be
exceptions that anyone is eligible for, should they find themselves in the right
circumstances. Everyone is required not to kill innocents, unless they can
save a greater number by doing so. Unless this generality condition is met,
according to Narveson, we have simply failed to meet a basic criterion for a
moral principle. As Narveson puts it in his essay “Moral Realism, Emotivism
6
and Natural Law,” “[n]o generalization, no morals.”
c. Concerned with each individual s interests
The last aspect of Narveson’s theory on which I wish to focus is also
the most difficult to explain clearly. It reflects a sort of thoroughgoing
individualism that can be found in Narveson’s work, both in his political and
his ethical philosophy. In the political realm this individualism is most
4

See Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, pp. 114, 126.

5

Ibid., p. 124.

6

Narveson, Respecting Persons in Theory and Practice, p. 69.
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obviously reflected in Narveson’s libertarianism. Each person qua individual
holds certain rights, it is only qua individuals that we hold rights, and it is the
purpose of the state to protect these individual rights—that’s all. But there is
another, even deeper, way in which Narveson’s political thought is
individualistic, reflected in his understanding of what it is for a political
theory to be “liberal” in the broad sense. What this means, according to
Narveson, is that the theory “must justify principles, policies, and institutions,
to any person affected by them, by showing that person they are for his or her
7
good as seen by that person.” In other words, it is a condition on the
legitimacy of political principles, policies, and institutions that they serve the
good of each and every person that they affect. This is the source of their
authority over us. It is not that they are stamped by the imprimatur of Divine
Authority, or that they maximize aggregate welfare, or manifest The Absolute.
These are all fine things, to be sure, but in order for a political institution to be
justified to me, it must serve my good—and if I don’t care about Divine
Authority, or aggregate welfare, or whatever, then the fact that political
institutions are related to these things does nothing to legitimize their
authority.
The third important aspect of Narveson’s moral theory that I want to
discuss, then, is that morality works in basically the same way. Just as it is a
condition on the legitimacy of some purported political principle that it serve
the interests of all of those that it affects, so is it a condition on the legitimacy
of moral principles that they advance the interests of those to whom they are
meant to apply. Moral facts, in other words, are not like rocks. Their
existence is not something which is completely independent of their
relationship to us—our thoughts and interests. Indeed, any moral theory
which held that moral facts were independent in this way would be, in
8
Narveson’s words, “utterly pointless.”
This aspect of Narveson’s theory is reflected most clearly in his
contractarianism. The basic idea of contractarian theory, of course, is that
whatever is the subject of the contract (be it political authority or moral
principles), it must be justified to each person based on his own interests,
since the contract is only binding on those who “sign” it, and persons are
9
assumed not to sign something that is not in their interests.
This
individualism, indeed, is often taken to be part of the appeal of
contractarianism. After all, it’s hard to see how one could do a better job at
7

Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, p. 8.

8

Narveson, Respecting Persons in Theory and Practice, p. 65.

9

See, e.g., David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (New York: Clarendon Press, 1986).
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justifying something than by showing that it is in the interests of each and
every person who is subject to it.
Most contractarian theories however, fudge a bit on this part of the
theory. For while they may claim that their contract mechanism justifies its
conditions to all persons, upon closer examination it is revealed that the
signatories of the contracts are not actual persons at all, but persons whose
individual characteristics have been stripped away in the name of idealization
10
to the point where they are scarcely recognizable as persons at all.
On
Narveson’s account, however, the persons to whom morality must be justified
are actual persons, with all of their idiosyncratic preferences, histories, powers
and vulnerabilities, material and social endowments, and so forth. This fact is
of crucial importance for Narveson’s theory, and connects (as we shall see in
the next section) with the first feature of Narveson’s theory of morality that I
noted—the fact that it necessarily gives us reasons for action. For if morality
were not so justified to each of us, then what reason would we have to care
what morality asked us to do? This, in fact, is what Narveson sees as the
fundamental problem with utilitarianism as a moral theory. The fundamental
problem is not that utilitarianism yields counter-intuitive results—Narveson is
11
appropriately critical of appeals to intuition in moral argument.
The
fundamental problem is that utilitarianism has no answer to the question of
why individuals should care about maximizing aggregate utility. An adequate
moral theory must provide individuals—real individuals, not made-up
idealized ones—with reasons to care about its precepts, and this requires
connecting the demands of morality in some way to the agent’s interests.
3. Metaethical Presuppositions
The last ten years or so have witnessed an explosion of scholarship in
analytic metaethics. This sub-discipline of philosophy attempts to provide
answers to questions about the fundamental nature of morality, its objectivity
or mind-dependence, the relationship between morality and practical reason,

10
See, e.g., John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1971). For Rawls, of course, the contract device is not really a contract at all,
but a heuristic for explaining and making clear the alleged appeal of moral principles
which he supports on altogether different grounds. On this point, see Will Kymlicka,
Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), chap. 3. For a criticism of the use of such arguments in
justifying state authority, see David Schmidtz, “Justifying the State,” Ethics 101, no. 1
(1990), pp. 89-102.
11

See Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, chap. 10.
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12

and so on. What I hope to do in this next section of the essay is to take the
informal presentation of Narveson’s theory which I gave in the previous
section, and examine it to see how it can be classified given the categories
common to contemporary metaethical discourse.
a. Internalism
First and perhaps most importantly, Narveson’s theory is a kind of
internalist theory. Now, internalism is one of those many problematic terms
in philosophy that means a number of different things depending on the
context in which the term is used. To clarify, then, the kind of internalism to
be found in Narveson’s theory is what has been called morality-reasons
13
internalism.
And what this form of internalism says is that there is a
conceptual, internal connection between judging something to be a valid
moral requirement, and its giving agents a reason to act. In other words,
morality is necessarily reason-giving. This sort of internalism has probably
been most famously defended by Michael Smith in his 1994 book The Moral
14
Problem, and has a large fan club among contemporary philosophers. And
it’s easy to see why. After all, morality is supposed to be practical and indeed
overriding with regard to all other practical concerns we might have.
Morality-reasons internalism reflects this belief and its alleged centrality to
our moral practice by building it into our very concept of morality.
b. Non-relativism
Second, we can read Narveson’s insistence on the general nature of
moral demands as asserting a rejection of normative moral relativism,
understood by Gilbert Harman as the claim that “different people can be
15
subject to different ultimate moral demands.”
The term “ultimate” is
12
For overviews of the field, see Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1994), or Alexander Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003). More ambitious readers can find a collection of
many of the seminal original papers in the field in Andrew Fisher and Simon Kirchin,
Arguing about Metaethics (New York: Routledge, 2006).
13

It has also been referred to as “motivational judgment internalism.” See Connie
Rosati, “Moral Motivation,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available
online at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-motivation/.
14

See, e.g., Christine Korsgaard, “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” Journal of
Philosophy 83 (1986), pp. 1-25; Smith, The Moral Problem; and Mark van Roojen,
“Motivational Internalism: A Somewhat Less Idealized Version,” Philosophical
Quarterly 50 (2000), pp. 233-41.
15

Gilbert Harman, “What Is Moral Relativism?” in Alan Goldman and Jagweon Kim,
eds., Values and Morals (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978), pp. 143-61.
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important here, for even a non-relativist will want to admit that different
people can be subject to different moral demands in some sense. For example,
if I borrow ten dollars from Jack and you don’t, then I am subject to a moral
demand to pay Jack ten dollars, and you are not. But the moral demand to pay
Jack ten dollars is not an ultimate moral demand, in Harman’s sense, since it
derives from a general moral obligation to repay one’s debts, and that is a
moral demand to which we are both subject. To say that people differ in their
ultimate moral demands would be to say that people’s moral demands differ
not just because some underlying moral demand that applies to both yields
different subsidiary demands in different factual contexts, but for some other
reason which does not depend on more basic moral demands.
c. Internalism again
I mentioned that the term internalism has a number of different
meanings in philosophy. And, as it turns out, Narveson subscribes to not just
one but two of them. The second sort of internalism that his theory exhibits
can be seen in what I called the “individualism” of his moral theory above.
Narveson seems to accept the idea that for a certain consideration to count as
a reason for an agent to act in a certain way, that consideration must be
capable of motivating the agent, at least as long as the agent is being rational.
This sort of internalism we can call reasons-motive internalism, since it posits
a necessary conceptual connection between something’s being a reason, and
16
its having a certain sort of motivational effect on a rational agent. The most
well-known presentation of this sort of theory is to be found in Bernard
17
Williams’s famous essay on internal and external reasons.
And this
position, too, has both a large number of proponents among contemporary
metaethicists and a good deal to be said in favor of it. After all, if a certain
consideration could not motivate me to act in a certain way, no matter how
much I thought about it, no matter how much information I had, and no matter
how rational my deliberative processes were—if, after all this, the
consideration leaves me cold, then in what sense can it really be said to be a
reason for me to act? You (or society in general) might have reasons to get me
to act in the relevant way, but if the action in question doesn’t link up in the
right way with anything that I care about, then how can it be a reason for me?
And if reasons aren t determined by what I care about, then what on earth are
they determined by? It seems that any rejection of reasons-motive internalism
would make the nature of reasons utterly mysterious.
16

It has also been called simply “reasons internalism”; see Rosati, “Moral
Motivation.”
17

Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” in Ross Harrison, ed., Rational
Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 17-28.
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4. Narveson’s Dilemma
Now that I have classified Narveson’s theory in contemporary
metaethical terms, I am ready to show the problem faced by the type of theory
with which this leaves him. In short, the problem is that morality-reasons
internalism, reasons-motive internalism, and non-relativism are mutually
inconsistent when combined with some extremely reasonable suppositions
about human nature. One of them has to be abandoned.
To see why, consider what is implied by the combination of the three
metaethical positions just identified. Reasons-motive internalism says that no
consideration counts as a reason for an agent unless that consideration would
be motivating to the agent were she to deliberate rationally upon it. Moralityreasons internalism says that morality necessarily gives agents reasons to act.
Already, we see a problem. How could morality necessarily give us a reason
to act if what we have reason to do depends on what would motivate us?
Presumably, not all persons are motivated by the same thing. To speak in
terms of a crude but basically sound moral psychology, what we are motivated
18
to do depends on our desires. And people’s desires plainly differ. The only
way to combine these two views, then, is to say that morality differs from
person to person. Sure, morality gives us all reason to act, but since what we
have reason to do depends on our desires, morality must in some sense depend
on our desires too. And since desires differ from person to person, so too will
morality.
Unfortunately, this move is ruled out by non-relativism. If we were
to hold that the demands of morality vary from person to person depending on
what that person desires, then we would clearly be violating the nonrelativism condition. One could seek to avoid this conclusion, I suppose, by
holding that on this theory people’s ultimate moral demands aren’t different–
everyone is under the moral requirement to do what they desire, and what this
18

Actually, this is not an entirely uncontroversial point, philosophically. It reflects
what has come to be known, perhaps anachronistically, as the Humean Theory of
Motivation. For representative defenses of this view, see Smith, The Moral Problem,
and Peter Railton, “Moral Realism,” Philosophical Review 95 (1986), pp. 163-207.
For criticisms, see John McDowell, “Virtue and Reason,” Monist 62 (1979), pp. 33150, and Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1998). While Humeanism about motivation is probably the
dominant view in contemporary metaethics (see Rosati, “Moral Motivation”), the
argument I advance here does not depend on the claim that all motivation is based
exclusively on desires. It is enough if some of our motivations are so based, even
partly so. If we are sometimes motivated by desires, and if our desires differ, and if
our reasons depend on our desires, then we will sometimes have different reasons to
act.
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entails just happens to differ from person to person. But this strikes me as a
pretty implausible move, and it leaves untouched the usual concerns
surrounding relativism, such as whether we all have the same basic rights, or
are under the same basic obligation to respect others rights, and so on.
Another, more plausible, possible move is to argue that people’s
desires aren t that different. Or, at least, they’re not different enough in the
ways that they would have to be in order to generate any worrisome results for
morality. Based on my reading of Narveson, this seems to be the
argumentative strategy most in line with his general approach. The basis of
his contractarian argument for libertarianism, after all, is that a principle of
respect for liberty would be “universally advantageous” to rational agents, “no
19
matter what their personal values or philosophy of life may be.”
Nonrelativism, on this view, is a contingent fact about morality, produced by
sufficient overlap in what motivates different human beings.
Empirically, I think the claim on which this strategy relies is a pretty
plausible one. Whatever other differences there might be among people, there
is a pretty broad overlap in their desire not to be attacked, robbed, etc. And
that is important—especially when combined with the fact that typically, the
best way to ensure that one does not get attacked, robbed etc, is for me not to
attack, rob, etc. others. But I’m not sure it takes us far enough. After all,
there are certainly some people whose desires are such that no amount of
20
rational reflection could sway them to care about the demands of morality.
Perhaps they enjoy immorality very much and would rather live a short
exciting life than what they perceive as a long, boring one. Or perhaps they
are simply very good at immorality and are willing to take the chance that
they will not be recognized as the defector they are. If even one such person
exists, then assuming we cling to the two sorts of internalism described above,
non-relativism fails.
5. Conclusion
My goal in raising such questions is not to point out inconsistencies
for the sake of pointing out inconsistencies. The dilemma I highlight here is
not some trivial byproduct of an error in Narveson’s theory. It is, I believe, a
reflection of a deep and important fact about the human condition.
19

Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, p. 148.

20

This claim is clearly true of so-called “psychopaths,” who tend cognitively to
understand the pain their behavior causes others, but who lack any affective response
to that knowledge. See Hervey Cleckley, The Mask of Sanity, 4th ed. (St. Louis, MO:
C. V. Mosby Company, 1964). I suspect it is true of a much wider class of individuals
as well, at least at certain times and in certain contexts.
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The goal of justifying the demands of morality by linking them to the
interests of each individual is a truly admirable one, and Narveson is to be
commended for taking the project on. But considerations such as the ones I
have presented above should give us reason to doubt whether the kind of
moral individualism reflected by Narveson’s metaethical commitment to
internalism can really be combined with a belief in universal human rights of
the sort that libertarians generally wish to defend.
In other words, if our concern is, as Narveson takes it to be, to come
up with a set of standards for the regulation of behavior that “does best for
each agent,” then we have good reason to wonder whether there is one such
21
set. The moral rules that serve the interests of able-bodied individuals with
large amounts of property at their disposal might very well be different from
those that serve the interests of the less-able (but still wily) propertyless
masses. The interests of the religious zealot who believes that the next world
is all that matters might very well be different from the interests of those who
are simply trying to live peaceful lives in this world. Is it really plausible that
there is one set of moral standards that does best for each and every one of the
diverse individuals living on this planet?
I doubt it. My own inclinations lead me to resolve the dilemma
above by abandoning non-relativism. The arguments that Narveson and
others have given us do, I think, show us that something like a libertarian
morality does a good job at advancing the interests of a whole diverse lot of
us. But not all of us, and not all the time. Sometimes some individuals will
have a legitimate reason to reject the morality that serves the interests of the
masses. Given their interests and circumstances, the action they have the
strongest reason to perform will be an immoral one. This, I think, is just a sad
fact about the world we live in. But it doesn’t undermine morality for the rest
of us. We still have reason to enforce norms against murder, even if you don’t
have an interest in obeying those norms. It’s nice to think that morality serves
the interests of each individual all the time, so that if only people were
smarter, or had a longer time horizon, or were better informed, or more
reflective, they would realize that they should abandon their life of
debauchery and accept morality’s embrace. And in a lot of cases, this will be
true. But not all of them. And when it’s not, it’s up to the rest of us to bully,
cajole, guilt-trip, and beat the offender into behaving in ways that are contrary
to his interests but in line with ours. The bad news is that the reason-giving

21

Narveson, Respecting Persons in Theory and Practice, p. 72.
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force of morality will only take us so far. The good news is that where
22
reasons run out, we have other methods at our disposal.

22

An earlier draft of this essay was presented at the 2006 meeting of the American
Association for the Philosophic Study of Society. Thanks to the participants in that
seminar, especially Jan Narveson and Roderick Long, for their comments.
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